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Abstract 
Cloud computing is a recently developed new technology for complex systems with massive-
scale service sharing, which is different from the resource sharing of the grid computing systems. 
Cloud reliability analysis and modeling are not easy tasks because of the complexity and large 
scale  of  the  system.  This  paper  systematically  analyzes  cloud  computing  and  models  the 
reliability of the cloud services. Various types of failures are interleaved in the cloud computing 
environment, such as overflow failure, timeout failure, resource missing failure, network failure, 
hardware failure, software failure, and database failure. This paper investigates all of them to 
achieve a comprehensive picture about cloud service reliability, and models those failures in a 
holistic manner using Markov models, Queuing Theory and Graph Theory. In accordance with 
the proposed model, a new evaluation algorithm is further developed in this paper integrating the 
Bayesian approaches together with the Graph Theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Cloud  computing  enables  the  massive-scale  service  sharing,  which  allows  users  to  access 
technology-enabled  services  without  knowledge  of,  expertise  with,  or  control  over  the 
technology infrastructure that supports them. Cloud computing is different from but related with 
grid computing, utility computing and transparent computing. Grid computing [1] is a form of 
distributed  computing  whereby  a  "super  and  virtual  computer"  composed  of  a  cluster  of 
networked,  loosely-coupled  computers  acts  in  concert  to  perform  very  large  tasks.  Utility 
computing [2] is the packaging of computing resources, such as computation and storage, as a 
metered service similar to a traditional public utility such as electricity. Transparent computing 
[3] means complex back-end services are transparent to users who only see a simple and easy-to-
use front-end interface. The cloud computing deployments are today powered by grids, having 
transparent characteristics and billed like utilities; but cloud computing is rather a natural next 
step from the grid-utility-transparent model. Based on this model, the cloud computing can rather 
realize the service sharing than only the resource sharing coined by grid computing. 
The cloud computing is thus more service-oriented than resource-oriented. Dai et al. [4] 
has already mentioned that the users do not care too much about the resources of the grid system 
but are more concerned with the services they are using. Hence, the function of service sharing 
enabled by cloud computing will be more interesting to general users than the resources sharing 
of the grid computing. A variety of cloud services are provided by the cloud system. The cloud 
system  could  become  very  large  even  all  over  the  whole  Internet.  Users  can  request  cloud 
services from any corner of the world. Some examples of commercial cloud services include 
Amazon EC2 [5], Xen [6], Google Cloud [7], IBM Cloud [8], and Microsoft Cloud [9].  
The  reliability  of  the  cloud  computing  is  very  critical  but  hard  to  analyze  due  to  its 
characteristics  of  massive-scale  service  sharing,  wide-area  network,  heterogeneous 
software/hardware components and complicated interactions among them. Hence, the reliability 
models for pure software/hardware or conventional networks [10-11] cannot be simply applied to 
study the cloud reliability. 
Therefore, this paper first presents an innovative reliability model for cloud computing. 
The cloud reliability model is service oriented and hierarchical, which is tractable and effective 
in addressing such a large and complex system. This new model comprehensively considers 
various types of failures that have significant influences on the success/failure of cloud services,   3
including overflow, timeout, data resource missing, computing resource missing, software failure, 
database failure, hardware failure, and network failure. 
The  remaining  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  a  general 
architecture of the cloud computing system and makes a thorough analysis of the cloud services. 
Section 3 builds a holistic model for cloud service reliability and presents a new evaluation 
algorithm. Section 4 concludes this paper and discusses the future research. 
 
2. Cloud Computing System and Failure Analysis  
Cloud  computing  is  distinguished  from  conventional  distributed  computing  by  its  focus  on 
massive-scale  service  sharing.  The  characteristics  of  the  cloud  computing  are  described  in 
subsection 2.1, and then various failures in a cloud service are analyzed in subsection 2.2.  
 
2.1.  Description of the cloud computing 
We  are  developing  a  cloud  computing  system  in  the  VGrADS  (Virtual  Grid  Application 
Development Software) project sponsored by National Science Foundation (NSF). This system 
has already been collaborating and integrated with Amazon EC2 [5]. The architecture of our 
cloud service system is depicted in Fig. 1, which is also a typical representation of most present 
or future cloud service systems. There is a cloud management system (CMS) which is composed 
by a set of servers (either centralized or distributed). The CMS mainly fulfills four different 
functions as shown in Fig. 1: 1) To manage a request queue that receives job requests from 
different users for cloud services; 2) To manage computing resources (such as PCs, Clusters, 
Supercomputers, etc.) all over the Internet; 3) To manage data resources (such as Databases, 
Publicized Information, URL contents, etc.) all over the Internet; and 4) To schedule a request 
and divide it into different subtasks and assign the subtasks to different computing resources that 
may access different data resources over the Internet.    4
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Fig. 1. Cloud Service System. 
When a user requests a certain given cloud service, we apply a workflow to describe and 
manage the cloud service [12]. Fig. 2 depicts a workflow template of a service that includes four 
different subtasks (S1, S2, S3, S4) and their interrelationship (data dependency), e.g. S3 needs 
the inputs that result from S1 and S2. It also shows the required data resources that the subtasks 
need to access, e.g., S1 needs to access data resource D1 when running, S2 needs D2 and D3, 
and  S4  needs  D4,  but  S3  needs  nothing.  With  the  given  workflow  of  a  cloud  service,  the 
scheduler in the CMS can assign these subtasks to different computing resources while allocating 
the data resources, as shown in Fig. 2, e.g., the computing resource C1 is assigned two subtasks, 
S1 and S3, to run, C5 is a data resource offering data D2, D3 and D4, and C3 is both computing 
resource and data resource to run subtask S2 while offering data D1 and D3. After the computing 
resources and data resources receive the commands/subtasks from the CMS, they form a network 
according to the connectivity or accessibility, e.g. C3 is directly connected with C5, but cannot 
directly communicate with C4 due to the connectivity (e.g. computers C3 and C4 may be both 
behind routers that translate their original IP addresses so that they cannot directly build the 
TCI/IP connection, or they do not have access to each other [13]).   5
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Fig. 2. Workflow of a Cloud Service and Scheduling 
The cloud network shown in Fig. 2 can be very large, and each link in Fig. 2 is actually a 
virtual link that may go through many components (routers/cables/optical fibers/machines) over 
a long distance. Thus, the computing resources will work together via the network to run the 
subtasks while accessing necessary data from the data resources. When the job is finished, the 
results will return to the user who requests this service, as shown in Fig. 1.   
 
2.2. Failure Analysis of Cloud Service 
As  Fig.  1  and  Fig.  2  show,  there  are  a  variety  of  types  of  failures  that  may  affect  the 
success/reliability  of  a  cloud  service,  including  Overflow,  Timeout,  Data  resource  missing, 
Computing resource missing, Software failure, Database failure, Hardware failure, and Network 
failure. We analyze these failures in more details.  
·  Overflow: The request queue should have a limitation on the maximal number of requests 
waiting in the queue. Otherwise, new requests have to wait for too long a time in the 
queue, which could make the Timeout failures much more dominant. Therefore, if the 
queue is full when a new job request arrives, it is simply dropped and the user is unable 
to get service, which is called an overflow failure. 
·  Timeout: The cloud service usually has its due time set by the user or the service monitor. If 
the waiting time of the request in the queue is over the due time, the Timeout failure 
occurs, see e.g. [14]. As a result, those timeout requests will be dropped from the queue 
so that not to affect other following requests. 
·  Data  resource  missing:  In  CMS,  the  data  resource  manager  (DRM)  registers  all  data 
resources. However, it is possible that some previously registered data are removed but   6
the DRM is not updated. As a result, if those data resources are assigned in a certain job 
request, they will cause the data resource missing failure. 
·  Computing  resource  missing:  Similarly  to  the  above  data  resource  miss,  the  computing 
resource missing may also occur, such as PC turns off without notifying the CMS. 
·  Software  failure:  The  subtasks  are  actually  software  programs  running  on  different 
computing resources, which contain software faults, see e.g. [15].   
·  Database failure: The database that stores the required data resources may also fail, causing 
that the subtasks when running cannot access the required data. 
·  Hardware failure: The computing resources and data resources in general have hardware 
(such as computers or servers) which may also encounter hardware failures.  
·  Network failure: When subtasks access remote data, the communication channels may be 
broken either physically or logically, which causes the network failure, especially for 
those long time transmissions of large datasets, see e.g. [16]. 
 
The model for cloud computing reliability has to consider all types of these failures, which 
would be very complicated and existing reliability models cannot address all of these concerns in 
a holistic manner although each single topic has been studied.  
Moreover, these different types of failures are actually correlated with one another (i.e., not 
independent) in a cloud service which exhibits another reason why the cloud reliability model 
cannot simply utilize any one single existing model in each individual topic (such as software 
reliability, hardware reliability, or network reliability). For example, failures of schedulers may 
increase the waiting time, which could affect the timeout and the overflow failures; a large queue 
limit may reduce the probability of overflow failure but may increase that of the timeout failure; 
a database failure may make a software unable to be finished due to lack of necessary data; 
network  failures  may  block  the  required  communications  among  software  programs  to  get 
necessary inputs from others. With such correlations, it is obvious that a new holistic model has 
to be developed for cloud reliability. 
 
3. Cloud Service Reliability Modeling and Evaluation 
In this section, we develop a holistic model for Cloud Service Reliability, which is defined as the 
probability that a cloud service under consideration can be successfully completed for a user in a   7
specified period of time. In particular, this requires that the job request be successfully served by 
the  schedulers  in  time,  the  set  of  subtasks  contained  by  the  service  be  completed,  the 
computing/data resources required by the subtasks be available; and the network be operational 
during the communications. 
From the definition of cloud service reliability, it is clear that all types of failures we have 
discussed in section 2 will more or less affect this probability to provide a successful service. We 
classify the above failures in two groups: 
1.  Request Stage Failures: Overflow and Timeout.  
2.  Execution  Stage  Failures:  Data  resource  missing,  Computing  resource  missing, 
Software failure, Database failure, Hardware failure, and Network failure. 
The  failures  in  Group  1  may  occur  before  the  job  request  is  successfully  assigned  to 
computing/data resources; on the other hand, the failures in Group 2 may occur after the job 
request has been successfully assigned and during the execution of subtasks. Therefore, the two 
groups of failures could be deemed as independent. Nevertheless, failures within each group are 
strongly correlated. In summary, the modeling of cloud service reliability can be separated in two 
parts: modeling of Request Stage Reliability and modeling of Execution Stage Reliability. 
 
3.1. Request Stage Reliabiliy 
This request stage contains two types of failures: overflow and timeout. The due time for a 
specific  service  is  the  allowed  time  spent  from  the  submission  of  the  job  request  to  the 
completion of the job. The due time can be set by the user or by the service monitor. If a job 
request is not served by a scheduler before the due time, it will be dropped. The dropping rate is 
denoted by  d m . 
Suppose the capacity of the request queue is N (the maximal number of requests in the 
queue). We assume that the arrival of submissions of job requests follow a Poisson process with 
the arrival rate of  a l .  
Usually, there are multiple schedule servers to serve the requests. These schedule servers 
are usually homogeneous with similar structures, schemes and equipments.  Here, we assume a 
total of S homogenous schedule servers are running simultaneously to serve the requests. The 
service time to complete one request by each schedule server is assumed to be an exponentially 
distributed quantity with parameter  r m . Thus, such process can be modeled by a Markov process   8
as depicted by Fig. 3, in which state n (n=0,1,…,N) represents the number of requests in the 
queue.  
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Fig. 3. Markov model for the request queue. 
In Fig. 3, the transition rate from state n to state n+1 is  a l . At state N, the arrival of a new 
request will make the request queue overflow, so the request is dropped and the queue still stays 
at state N. The service rate of a request by a schedule server is  r m . If  S n £ , then n requests can 
be immediately served by the S schedule servers, so the departure rate of any one request is equal 
to  r nm . If  S n > , only S requests are being simultaneously served by schedule servers, so the 
departure rate is  r Sm . The dropping rate for any one request in the queue to reach its due time is 
d nm  (n=1,2,…,N). 
Denote by  n q  the steady probability for the system to stay at state n (n=0,1,…,N). It is easy 
to derive  n q  by solving the following Chapman-Kolmogorov equations: 
  1 0 q q r a m l =         (2) 
y a
n
y
n r n a
n N
x
r q y n p q n q x p n l m l m ∑ ∑
-
=
+
-
=
- + + = 





+
1
0
1
1
) ( ) 1 ( ) (        (n=1,…,S-1)  (3) 
y a
n
y
n r n a
n N
x
r q y n p q S q x p S l m l m ∑ ∑
-
=
+
-
=
- + = 





+
1
0
1
1
) ( ) (         (n=S,…,N-1)        (4) 
y a
N
y
N r q y N p q S l m ∑
-
=
- =
1
0
) (       (5) 
And 
1
0
= ∑
=
N
n
n q           (6) 
The probability for the overflow failure NOT to occur is thus 
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where  n q  (n=0,1,…,N) can be obtained by solving equations (2)-(6).   9
To  study  the  timeout  failure,  suppose  the  current  length  of  the  request  queue  is  n 
(n=0,1,…,N-1) when the new service request under consideration arrives. The probability density 
function (p.d.f.) of waiting time to complete the n requests by S schedule servers is  
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If the waiting time is longer than the due time  d T , the timeout failure occurs. Therefore, 
the probability for the waiting time in completing the n+1 requests to be less than  d T  is 
∫ = <
d T
n d dt t f T t
0 ) ( } Pr{     S n ³         (9) 
If  S n < , then the new request that has arrived can be immediately served without any waiting 
time. Therefore, the probability for the timeout and overflow failures NOT to occur (i.e. the 
Request Stage is reliable) is 
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where  ) (t fn  can  be  obtained  by  (8).  The  summation  in  (10)  between  ] 1 , 0 [ - N  contains  a 
condition that the overflow failure not to occur as analyzed by the (7). Thus, in (10)  request R  
represents the probability without timeout or overflow failures. 
 
3.2.  Execution Stage 
3.2.1. A New Model 
To address various types of failures during the execution of a cloud service, we propose a new 
model here. All types of execution stage failures are integrated in this new model, as illustrated 
by a graph model in Fig. 4.    10
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Fig. 4. A graph model integrating different types of failures at the execution stage. 
In this model, hardware (such as a computer) is represented by a solid-line node, so the 
characteristics regarding the hardware (such as hardware failures, processing speed, etc.) can be 
associated with the node.  
The link of the network is represented by a solid line which represents a communication 
channel between two nodes, so the characters of the channel (such as link failure, bandwidths, 
etc.) can be associated with the link.  
Hardware may contain database or software required by the cloud service, so we suggest 
using virtual nodes to represent database or software programs, which are drawn as dashed-line 
circles.  The  idea  of  virtual  nodes  is  different  from  previous  graph  models  for  distributed 
computing systems [17]. Those models only exhibit the software/database inside the hardware 
node,  which  actually  fits  the  physical  structure  (e.g.  software  does  run  inside  the  computer 
hardware),  but  such  physical  representations  could  not  represent  the  heterogeneity  of 
hardware/software/databases  so  these  models  only  used  the  node  property  to  incorporate  all 
different characteristics. However, in cloud computing the heterogeneity is significant including 
various kinds of resources, so these resources should be treated respectively. The virtual nodes 
making physical structure inside-out can fulfill this requirement. As a result, the characteristics 
with respect to the database (such as size of data uploaded/downloaded, database failures, etc.) 
and to the software (such as software failures, and the running time of the software) can be 
associated with different virtual nodes without interfering the characteristics of hardware (the 
solid-line node). This virtual link (dashed line) connects different virtual nodes to their hosted 
hardware node. The virtual structure in Fig. 4, when exhibiting the heterogeneity, can also show   11
the failure correlation to accommodate to the practice better, e.g. if the hardware fails, then all 
those virtual nodes (components inside this hardware) are isolated from outside, which means 
unavailable at the same time to other external components.  
Finally, this graph model can also address the data/computing resources missing. Once the 
missing resources are included by the cloud scheduler by mistakes, we can address the missing in 
another  way,  i.e.,  the  resource  fails  at  the  beginning  of  the  execution  of  the  cloud  service. 
Thereby, the missing of resources can be incorporated in the hardware property, as a special type 
of hardware failure.  
In summary, the new  graph  model to be built  as per the above methodology can well 
address  those  different  failures  in  a  holistic  manner  for  a  given  cloud  service  during  the 
execution stage. 
 
3.2.2. Parameters 
In accordance with the new model as depicted by Fig. 4, the parameters with respect to different 
components are discussed here, which will be used in the proposed evaluation algorithm. 
For the i:th hardware node ( H i ,..., 2 , 1 = ), denote by  i ps  its Processing Speed, e.g. in MIPS 
(Million Instructions per Second). For the j:th data resource ( J j ,..., 2 , 1 = ), denote by  j sd  the 
Amount of Data downloaded/uploaded by remote software programs, e.g., in MB (Mega Bytes). 
For software (such as a software program to complete a subtask), denote by  k wp  ( K k ,..., 2 , 1 = ) 
the Workload of the k:th software program, e.g. in NoI (Number of Instructions) to be executed. 
Denote by  ij sd  ( J i ,..., 2 , 1 = ,  J j ,..., 2 , 1 = ,  j i ¹ ) the Amount of Data exchanged between the i:th 
subtask  and  the  j:th  subtask.  Denote  by  m bw  ( M m ,..., 2 , 1 = )  the  Bandwidth  of  the  m:th 
communication link, e.g. in bps (bit per second).  
Any  of  the  elements  of  hardware/database/software/links  may  encounter  failures.  The 
failure rate [11] is another parameter of interest. As explained by [18], in the operational phase 
of software, there will be no modifications made on the software source code, thus the software 
failure rate is a constant. For electronic hardware, a constant failure rate is normally observed in 
the operational phase as well. We thus denote by  ) ( n element l  the failure rate of the n:th element. 
Therefore, the reliability of each individual element can be derived as 
)} ( ) ( exp{ ) ( n w n n element T element element R × - = l ,      (11)   12
where  ) ( n w element T  denotes the length of working time of the n:th element in a cloud service, 
which can be derived, respectively, as follows.  
The time that the k:th software program is running on the i:th machine is 
i
k
w ps
wp
Software T = =
Speed   Processing
Workload   Software
) (       (12) 
The time that the m:th communication link is transmitting data is 
m
ij
w bw
sd
ion Communicat T = =
Bandwidth
Data   of Amount 
) (       (13) 
The  total  working  time  for  a  hardware  element  has  two  parts:  running  software  and 
transmitting data, thus 
∑ ∑ + =
Hardware
w
Hardware
w w ion Communicat T Software T Hardware T ) ( ) ( ) (   (14) 
which means the summation of the execution time of all software programs running on this 
hardware and the communication time of all channels going through this hardware.  
The  working  time  for  a  data  source  can  be  calculated  as  the  summation  of  all 
communication times that access the data on the data source. 
  ∑ =
Data
w w ion Communicat T DataSource T ) ( ) (         (15) 
With the working time derived by equations (12)-(15), the reliability of individual element 
can be obtained from (11), which is more realistic and practical than other conventional methods 
[17] assuming the reliabilities of elements (nodes and links) are constant, (e.g. a node is always 
90% reliable, regardless of how long it works). In fact, the reliability of individual element is 
affected by various conditions such as failure rate, amount of data, bandwidth, operation time, 
etc.  
 
3.2.3. New Evaluation Algorithm 
Though the new graph model and the parameters of elements are more realistic and practical, 
they also make the evaluation of overall reliability much more complicated so that the existing 
algorithms [17] could not be directly applied here.  For instance, those conventional algorithms 
have one or some of the following assumptions that are not applicable to evaluate the reliability 
given the above new model: 1) the network topology is made up of physical nodes/links without 
considering the virtual nodes/links; 2) the operational probabilities (reliabilities) of nodes or links   13
are constant; 3) only hardware failures of links and processors are considered without taking into 
account the software, data and resource failures. 
Therefore,  we further  present  a  new  algorithm  for  evaluating  the overall  cloud  service 
reliability considering all different factors during the execution stage given the new graph model 
and the above parameters. The new evaluation algorithm based on Graph theory and Bayesian 
theorem is presented to derive the reliability, as follows. 
 
A. Minimal Subtask Spanning Tree (MSST) 
The set of all nodes and links involved in completing a specific subtask form a Subtask Spanning 
Tree (SST). This SST can be considered to be a combination of several minimal subtask spanning 
trees  (MSSTs),  where  each  MSST  represents  a  minimal  possible  combination  of  available 
elements (nodes  and  links)  that  guarantees  the  success  to  execute  this  specific  subtask  (i.e., 
failure of any element in MSST leads to the subtask failure). By this definition of MSST, we can 
see that each MSST contains exactly one set of data resources without any duplications, because 
any duplication could be reduced to another smaller SST. Therefore, for any MSST, the data 
resources and precedent subtasks that provide certain input for the subtask are also determined.  
One can also obtain the working times of different elements by (12)-(15). 
Some elements inside one MSST can still belong to several paths if they are involved in 
different communications tasks, such as data transmission or data resource access. Note that all 
elements in the execution stage are hot-standby although some elements/subtasks may be waiting 
for the output of some other subtasks. So during the waiting period, those elements are also 
possible to fail. Thus, we suppose that an MSST completes the entire service if all of its elements 
do not fail during the maximal time allowed to complete all subtasks in executing which they are 
involved. Therefore, when calculating the element reliability in a given MSST, one has to use the 
corresponding record with maximal time.  
Assume there are a total of K elements in an MSST, and  i element (i=1,2,…,K) denotes the 
i:th element in the MSST. Accordingly, the communication time of the i:th element is denoted by 
) ( i w element T  and  ) ( i element l  represents its failure rate. The reliability of this single MSST can 
be simply expressed as 
  MSST R =Õ
=
× -
K
i
i w i element T element
1
)} ( ) ( exp{ l        (16)   14
With this equation, the reliability of an MSST can be computed if the working times of all the 
elements are obtained. Hence, finding all the MSSTs and determining the working time of their 
elements are the first step in deriving the execution reliability of a cloud service. To solve the 
graph traversal problem, several classical algorithms have been suggested, such as depth-first 
search, breadth-first search, etc. These algorithms can find all MSSTs in an arbitrary graph. Here, 
we propose a depth-first search algorithm here, which is briefly described as follows:  
Step 1. Given a program/subtask, say  m S , start from a node that contains this program, to 
search the required data resources and precedent subtasks/programs along the possible 
links, and record elements that compose the searching route and their communication 
times.  
Step 2. Until all the required data resources and precedent subtasks/programs are reached, an 
MSST is found, and record this MSST.  
Step 3. Then other routes are tried to search other MSSTs until all the MSSTs are searched.  
Step 4. Change to another node that also contains the program  m S . Repeat the above three 
steps until all the nodes that have  m S  are evaluated. Save all the MSSTs found associated 
with  m S  into the vector  ) ( m S MSST . 
Step 5. Change to another program and repeat the above four steps until all the programs are 
explored. Then all the vectors of  ) ( m S MSST  (m=1,2,…M) are generated. 
 
B. Minimal Execution Spanning Tree (MEST) 
Similar to the MSST, a Minimal Execution Spanning Tree (MEST) represents a minimal possible 
combination of available elements (nodes and links) that guarantees the success to execute the 
entire service. Thus, at least one MSST of each  ) ( m S MEST  (m=1,2,…M) must be reliable, and 
then the subtask  m S  (m=1,2,…M) can be connected to those remote resources and exchange data 
with them successfully through the network. If any set of the M subtasks are successful, then the 
execution is reliable for the cloud service to execute the required set of subtasks, so the MEST 
could be derived as the intersection of the above sets of MSSTs as 
I
M
m
m S MSST MEST
1
) (
=
=           (17) 
In practice, all MESTs could be generated in the following steps: 
  Step 1: Select an MSST from each set of  ) ( m S MSST  where (m=1,2,…M).    15
  Step 2: M MSSTs are obtained and put them together to generate the MEST. For each 
common element when intersecting trees together, record the greater working time as the final 
working time of this element in the MEST. 
  Step 3: Repeat Step 1-2 until all combinations are tried to generate all N MSSTs. 
 
Similar to (16), the reliability of a single MEST can be calculated by 
MEST R = Õ
Î
× -
MEST i
i w i element T element )} ( ) ( exp{ l       (18) 
 
C. Execution Reliability 
Having the list of N MESTs and the corresponding task completion time, one can determine 
the reliability of cloud service at the execution stage, as follows.  
 


 


=
= U
N
i
i execute MEST R
1
Pr           (19) 
which means any one MEST out of the total N MESTs being succeeded will make the cloud 
service successfully executed in the execution stage.  Denote event  j E  the successful operation 
of the  j MEST  while  j E  the failure of the  j MEST . Using the Bayesian theorem on conditional 
probability, we can derive (19) to a summation of conditional probabilities 
 


 


=
= U
N
i
i execute MEST R
1
Pr = ( ) ( ) ∑
=
- ×
i N
j
j j j E E E E E
1
1 2 1 , , , Pr Pr L       (20) 
The  probability  ( ) j E Pr  can  be  directly  obtained  from  (18)  as 
j MEST R  and  the  probability 
( ) j j E E E E 1 2 1 , , , Pr - L  can be computed by the following two-step algorithm. 
Step 1 identifies the failures of all of the critical elements in a period of time during which 
they lead to the failures of any one MEST from previous j-1 MESTs, but do not affect  j MEST .  
Step 2 generates all the possible combinations of the identified critical elements that lead to 
the  event  j j E E E E 1 2 1 , , , - L  by  a  binary  search,  and  computes  the  probabilities  of  those 
combinations. Their summation is  } , , Pr{ 1
___
2
___
1 j j E E E E - L .    16
When calculating the failure probabilities of MESTs’ elements the maximal time from the 
corresponding records in a list for the given MEST should be used.  
Finally,  if  a  cloud  service  needs  to  be  successfully  completed,  both  request  stage  and 
execution stage should be reliable. After we derive the reliability for both stages, we can hereby 
get the cloud service reliability  Service R  as  
= Service R request R execute R          (21) 
where  request R  can be derived from the reliability of request stage by (10), and  execute R  can be 
derived from the reliability of execute stage by (20). 
 
4. Conclusion and Discussion  
In this paper, reliability modeling and analysis of cloud service is conducted. We first elaborate 
various types of possible failures in a cloud service, based on which a holistic reliability model is 
developed.  A  new  algorithm  is  proposed  to  evaluate  cloud  service  reliability  based  on  the 
developed model. 
The developed cloud service reliability model and evaluation algorithm, however, is yet to 
be validated by simulation and real-life data. This issue shall be addressed in our future research.  
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